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land, Orth, C. J., affirmed, holding the
doctrine of respondeat superior not to
apply so as to make employer liable for
damages suffered by the customer. This
was so held because the other defendant
who assaulted the customer, while an
employee of the corporation, was not on
duty at the time of the assault nor was he
an employee of that particular store
where the assault occurred and was only
present because he was shopping for his
own personal use.

judidal
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By Arthur M. Frank

TORTS-False Arrest
In Kimbrough v. Giant Food Inc., 339
A.2d 688 (1975), a supermarket night
watchman brought action against the
supermarket and two store detectives for
false arrest. The Circuit Court directed a
verdict for the defendants. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, Davidson,
J., held that where the store detectives
saw the night watchman leave the
supermarket after work carrying two
bags of groceries which had been left at
the store the previous evening by a customer, and that the night watchman had
not paid for same and could offer no
credible explanation, the store detectives had probable cause to arrest the
watchman for shoptlifting and to institute
criminal proceedings against him. The
defendants were thereby exempt from
civil liability for false arrest and imprisonment and for malicious prosecution.
TORTS-Agency
In Rusnock v. Giant Food, Inc., 337
A.2d 445 (1975), a tort action was filed
against Giant Food, Inc. alleging that
one of its employees assaulted the plaintiff while in its store. The Circuit Court directed a verdict for the defendant, and
the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-

TORTS-Deceit
Donald E. Schwartzbeck brought action against an automobile dealer for
common-law deceit. He had bought an
automobile as a "demonstrator" and
later learned that the car had in fact been
previously sold and owned by a private
individual. Judgement was rendered for
the defendant-dealer and the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, Powers,
J., affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover in absence of
proof of compensatory damages, and
that punitive damages were not allowable in absence of such proof.
Schwartzbeck v. Loving Chevrolet, Inc.,
339 A.2d 700 (1975).
TORTS-Liability for Executing a Warrant
Plaintiff-Ballew sued the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act after having been shot while federal
agents and local police were attempting
to conduct a search of his apartment
pursuant to a warrant. The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, Alexander Harvey, II, J., rendered
judgement for the government, holding
that the federal agents acted reasonably
and in exercise of due care in procuring
the warrant. Also, the federal agent in
shooting at the plaintiff inside his apartment was acting reasonably under
emergency conditions then existing in
order to avoid injury to himself in that the
plaintiff was pointing a revolver at the
agent. Further, the plaintiff knew the offiGers were at his door, and rather than
admitting them and submitting to a
search, he attempted to barricade the
door and prevent entry. The plaintiff was
thus contributorily negligent. Ballew v.
United States, 389 F. Supp. 47 (1975).

TORTS-Emotional
(CONTRACTS)

Disturbance

Action was brought by parents against
a nursing home, in which their son was
being cared for at the time of his death,
for damages because of mental stress
based on both tort and contract claims.
In this case of White v. Diamond, 390 F.
Supp. 867 (1975), the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Frank A. Kaufman, J., granted defendant's motion for summary judgement
holding, inter alia, that under the applicable Maryland law the parents were not
entitled to recover damages for emotional disturbance because of defendant's alleged negligence. Nor could the
parents recover, the Court held, for
breach of contract in which the parents
claimed to be third-party beneficiaries.
CONTRACTS-Covenants Not To
Compete
InHebb v. Stump, Harvey and Cook,
Inc., 334 A.2d 563 (1975), the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland noted that
for alleged violations of covenants not to
compete in employment contracts, the
types of restrictions which typically have
been held to be seperable, fall into the
following categories (citing Williston and
the Restatement); (1) restrictions which
cover an excessive area, (2) restrictions
which cover an excessive time, (3) restrictions which are too broad in the nature ofthe business included, and (4) restrictions which are too broad in the class
of persons with whom the promisor engages not to compete. [In the present
case, the covenant was held enforceable].
CRIMINAL LAW
In Sutton v. State, 334 A.2d 126
(1975), the Court of Special Appeals,
Gilbert, J., held, inter alia, that there was
reversible error in using against defendant his in-custody silence, following the
invocation of his Miranda rights, in order
to impeach defendant with respect to his
trial testimony that a third person had
committed the crime with which he was
charged.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Lowe, J., in Perkins v. State, 339
A.2d 360 (1975), inter alia, rejected defendant's defense ol (?ptrapment. It was

held that the defendant, convicted of unlawful distribution of marijuana, conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous
substance laws, and maintenance of a
common nuisance, was not the victim of
entrapment just because police officers
simulated smoking marijuana in his presence, lulling defendant into believing
thatthe officer, like himself, acquired the
smoking habit in Viet Nam. The Court
stated that the defendant failed to show
the requisite repeated and persistent solicitation of a previously law-abiding citizen in order to overcome his reluctance
to commit a crime, and, as there was no
inducement, there was no entrapment.
In Redman v. State, 337 A.2d 441
(1975), two defendants' convictions of
grand larceny and possession of controlled paraphernalia were reversed and
remanded by the Court os Special Appeals of Maryland, Moylan, J. The defendants were absent from a portion of a
pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress
physical evidence and to suppress an
in-court identification. This was held to
be reversible error in that a suppression
hearing is a stage ofthe "trial," and thus,
the defendants had a right to be present.
In Johnson v. State, 336 A.2d 113
(1975), after the defendant was convicted of burglary and sentenced to
twelve years by the trial court, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland, Digges,
J., vacated the sentence because of
statements of the trial judge at the time oj
allocution. It was apparent to the Court
of Special Appeals that the trial judge, at
least in some degree, punished the defendant more severely because he failed
to plead guilty and instead stood trial. It
was held improper to conclude the defendant's constitutionally-protected decision to plead not guilty, requiring the
State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, be a factor
which influences the judge to the defendant's detriment. The Court noted that
this view is in accord with nearly all of the
U.S. courts, both federal and state, that
have considered the question.

COMMERCE-Federal v. State Regulatory Powers
In Becker v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 340A.2d 324 (1975), the

Court of Special Appeals, Orth, C. J., reviewed whether or not federal regulations of a field of commerce should be
preemptive of state regulatory powers.
The Court, citing Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, stated "that three of
the most widely accepted tests for supercession were (1) the scheme of federal
regulation was so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement
it; (2) the federal statutes touch a field in
which federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system must be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject; (3) enforcement of
state legislation presents a serious
danger of conflict with the administration
of the federal program." Applying these
tests to the present case, the federal act
in question (the Lanham Act) was held
not preemptive of Maryland's power to
regulate marketing agreements between
distributors and dealers of gasoline
products.

POLICE DEPARTMENT HAIR
REGULATION
A former county policeman brought
action seeking damages and an injunction ariSing out of his discharge for failure
to conform to a county police department hair regulation. The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland
granted defendant's motion for summary judgement. In Schott v. Fornoff,
515 F.2d 344 (1975), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,
holding the police department's hair
regulation to be arbitrary and capricious.
It was reasoned that a one-quarter inch
clearance between hair on side of head
and the ear did not bear a reasonable relationship to the constitutionallypermissible objective or efficient police
enforcement. [Widener, Circuit Judge,
filed opinion dissenting from denial of
rehearing in which Field, Circuit Judge,
joined].

CHIROPRACTIC PHYSICIANS
An action was brought for a declaratory judgement and injunction against
chiropractors' use of the term "physician" by itself or in a combination with

other words. The Circuit Court of Baltimore City, James W. Murphy, J., entered the injunction. In Beverungem v.
Briele, 333 A.2d 664 (1975), the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland, Orth, J.,
affirmed, holding that use of the phrase
"chiropractic physician" by a chiropractor who is not licensed to practice
medicine is prohibited. It was reasoned
that the use of "physician" in connection
with the name of a person implies that he
is engaged in the practice of medicine so
that if a person so using the word is not,
in fact, licensed to practice, by the mere
use of the word he is unlawfully engaged
in the practice of medicine.

NOTES ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS
On July 24, 1975, Attorney General
Francis B. Burch and Assistant Attorney
General John P. Stafford Jr. responded
to Donald C. Barnes' request as to
whether Frederick County Jail inmates
may be denied the right to receive newspapers when they have access to radio,
television, magazines, and books. The
reasons for wanting to deny the privilege
of receiving newspapers are that, in the
past, newspapers have been used to clog
toilets, to start fires, to cause inmates to
request a change of venue because of
undue publicity, and to cause inmates to
become distraught or unnerved.
The Opinion by the Attorney General
for the State of Maryland was that these
reasons are insufficient to override either
the pretrial inmates', or the convicted
prisoners', First Amendment right to receive newspapers. It was noted that limitations as to time and place may eliminate some of the problems.
It was stated that "[i]nmates do not
lose all their constitutional rights because
of their incarceration. Washington v.
Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966),
affd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). The right to
receive newspapers is part of the First
Amendment rights." [citations omitted].
Further, Seale v. Manson, 326 F.
Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971) observed
that "the difficulties in the administration
of a prison community and the need for
restrictive regulations are recognized,
but also, the personal and civil rights of
the prisoner must be respected."

